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Abstract
Survey data suggests that news of changes in business conditions are signicantly related
to house prices and consumers' beliefs of favorable buying conditions in the housing market.
This paper explores the transmission of \news shocks" as a source of boom-bust cycles in the
housing market. News on shocks originated in dierent sectors of the economy can generate
booms in the housing market in accordance with the average behavior in the data; expectations
on monetary policy and inationary shocks that are not fullled can also lead to the observed
subsequent macroeconomic recession. Investigating the role of the credit market for house
market uctuations we nd that favorable credit conditions that are expected to be reversed
in the near future generate boom-bust cycle dynamics in line with the most recent episode.
Further, credit conditions also aect boom-bust cycles generated by news shocks originated
in other sectors of the economy. In particular, lower loan-to-value ratios reduce the severity
of expectations-driven cycles and the volatility of household debt, aggregate consumption and
GDP.
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71 Introduction
Boom-bust cycles in asset prices and economic activity are a central issue in policy and academic
debates. Following the recent bursting of the housing bubble and the ensuing nancial crisis,
particular attention has been given to the behavior of housing prices and housing investment. This
paper suggests a mechanism for modeling housing-market boom-bust cycles in accordance with the
empirical pattern.
Over the last three decades, housing price boom-bust cycles in the United States have been
characterized on average by hump-shaped co-movement in GDP, consumption, investment, hours
worked, real wages and housing investment. More precisely, these macroeconomic variables gen-
erally grow during the boom phase of housing prices and fall during the bust phase. Moreover,
housing prices peaks are typically followed by macroeconomic recessions. Modeling endogenous
boom-bust cycles in macroeconomics, however, is a major challenge. It is dicult to generate ex-
tended periods of sustained house price growth followed by reversals through unanticipated shocks,
which generate the strongest responses in the short run and eventually die out.
An often-heard explanation of housing booms is households' optimism about future house price
appreciation. In particular, Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) documented that belief of rising prices
increased during the last housing boom exactly when prices reached their historical highs and
that expectations of future house prices appreciation are related to optimism about economic
conditions. Nofsinger (2011) argues that the emotions and psychological biases of households
play an important role in the boom bust economic cycle, with increase speculative behavior late
in an economic expansion and restrict economic behavior in a contraction.1 Using data from
the Michigan Survey of Consumers we document that news heard of recent changes in business
conditions are signicantly related to consumers' belief of favorable buying conditions in the housing
market both when the opinion is based on the perception of the current state of the economy and
when it is driven by expectations of rising house prices or tighter future credit. News heard
of changes in business conditions also contain statistically signicant information for house price
growth. Moreover, both news on business conditions and expectations of rising house prices and
future tighter credit conditions are signicantly related to house price growth. These ndings
suggest a potential role for expectations-driven cycles in the housing market.
1At the peak of the boom, households have bought assets at high prices, overburdened themselves with debt, and
reduced their savings rate. In bust times, the household biases and fear lead to selling previously popular assets at
low prices. Households then repay debt and save more, which drags on an already slow economy.
8This paper shows that news on a variety of shocks can be a source of optimism about future
house price appreciation. Such news shocks generates empirically plausible housing market uctu-
ations characterized by hump-shaped co-movement with macroeconomic variables. Our theoretical
framework extends the model of the housing market developed by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) to
allow for news on shocks originated in dierent sectors of the economy. A necessary condition for
a boom to emerge is that agents expect rising house prices, which in turn fuels current housing de-
mand and lifts housing prices immediately. Because impatient households borrow a fraction of the
future expected value of their houses, the increase in housing prices is coupled with an endogenous
increase in household indebtedness. If expectations are not fullled, a bust occurs with a dramatic
drop in both quantities and prices.
Expectations of future developments in several sectors of the economy can generate housing-
market boom-bust cycles characterized by co-movement in GDP, consumption, investment, hours
and real wages. In particular, news on both productivity and monetary policy shocks can be a
source of empirically plausible booms in house prices. However, only expectations of shocks related
to the behavior of nominal variables, such as the policy rate and ination, that are not met are
also likely to cause a subsequent macroeconomic recession.
We also investigate the role of credit conditions as a source of housing market uctuations.
Survey data suggests that current favorable credit conditions as well as expected future tighter
credit conditions are important reasons for consumers to judge house buying conditions as good.
In our model a contemporaneous, exogenous easing of credit conditions that is expected to be
reversed in the near future generates dynamics in line with the recent boom-bust cycle in the
housing market.
Last, we explore the role of credit conditions for the transmission of boom-bust cycles driven by
news on shocks originated in other sectors of the economy. We nd that lower Loan-to-Value ratios
reduce the severity of boom-bust cycles in household debt, consumption and GDP. Accordingly,
solving the model under a variety of unanticipated and news shocks, we nd that lower LTV
ratios imply lower volatility of these variables over the business cycle. These results highlight the
importance of taking into account the eect of credit standards and nancial regulation for house
price dynamics into the standard macroeconomic frameworks used for policy analysis.
Few other papers relate booms and busts in the housing market to expectations on future
fundamentals. Tomura (2010) documents that boom-bust cycles in house prices can be generated
by uncertainty about the duration of a temporary increase in income growth only if the economy is
9open to international capital ows; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2010) generate boom and
bust in the housing market relying on heterogeneous expectations about long-run fundamental that
drive house prices, as summarized by the ow of utility of holding a house. Dierently from them,
we explore the transmission mechanism of expectations related to dierent sectors of the economy
and we highlight the importance of credit conditions as a source of boom-bust cycles in the housing
market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the average behavior of
several macroeconomic variables during four boom-bust episodes in the U.S. housing market in the
last four decades and explore the relationship between consumers' survey data and house prices
growth. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 investigates the occurrence of boom-bust cycles
in the housing market as a consequence of expectations regarding future macroeconomic develop-
ments driven by news shocks. Section 5 shows the eect of current and expected credit conditions
for boom-bust cycles and Section 6 investigates the role of credit conditions for macroeconomic
uctuations. Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts about Housing Dynamics
2.1 Housing Boom-Bust Episodes
Over the period 1965:1 to 2009:2 real house prices in the United States display a number of boom-
bust episodes, namely periods of faster-than-trend growth followed by sharp reversals. See Figure
1. We dene a peak as the centered maximum in real house prices in a twenty-one-quarter window.2
Using this denition we identify four boom-bust episodes that peaked in 1973:3; 1979:4; 1989:2;
2006:2.3 Interestingly, real house prices peaks are always followed by macroeconomic recessions.
Every housing peak as dened above has been followed by an economic downturn. Even the housing
price high of 1969:4, which does not qualify as a peak according to our denition because real house
2A more stringent denition would require the peak to be the high of a longer centered window. For example, if
we require the window to be twenty-ve quarters, as in Ahearne et al. (2005), the 1973:3 high in real house prices
would fail to be a peak. In general, upward trending house prices make it dicult to identify peaks in long, centered
windows because prices do not fall all the way to the levels they had at the beginning of the boom. On the other
hand, a shorter centered window of seventeen quarters would deliver an additional peak in 1969:4.
3Our denition of peak is robust to de-trending, either with a linear trend or with an Hodrick-Prescott lter.
Using the H-P lter and the twenty-one quarters denition of window would deliver two additional peaks in 1994:1
and 1999:2, the same peaks in 1973:3, 1979:4 and 1989:2, and it would put the most recent peak in 2007:1.
10prices rebounded too quickly, was followed by a recession.
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of a set of key macroeconomic variables in the most re-
cent boom-bust episode.4 Real GDP, real private consumption, real private residential and non-
residential investment co-move with real house prices. Real households' loans grow during the
boom phase and peak several quarters after the peak in house prices. The peak in real house
prices occurs roughly at the trough of real wages in both sectors. In particular, it appears that
nominal wages have not fallen at all in the construction sector and have fallen very little in the
consumption-good sector since the beginning of the recession. It is worth mentioning that similar
dynamics are found in all other peaks, only exception is the behavior of the real wages.5 In fact,
dierently from the latest boom-bust episode, on average real wages rise during the booms in house
prices and fall during the busts. Figure 3 shows that the average behavior of all series display
signicant co-movement with house prices around the four boom-busts in house prices.
Next we transform our variables in deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott lter and then calculate
the average over the four housing-peak episodes. This allows us to see if housing boom-bust episodes
are accompanied by below- or above-trend behavior of some variables. Figure 4 shows the data. In
particular, real house prices, real GDP, private consumption and investment, both residential and
non-residential, and real loans fall below trend at the end of the bust phase.
2.2 Survey Data and House Market Dynamics
The previous section presented unconditional, ex-post evidence that housing boom-bust episodes
are characterized by bell-shaped co-movement among aggregate variables. This section provides
some suggestive evidence on the importance of news for housing market dynamics. We rely on
survey data from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers, which provides assessments
of consumer attitudes and expectations. We focus on two questions: a) News Heard of Recent
Changes in Business Conditions; b) Buying Conditions for Houses.
The index of News Heard of Recent Changes in Business Conditions (News on Business Condi-
tions henceforth) reports the fraction of respondents who heard favorable news minus the fraction
of respondents who heard negative news of recent changes in business conditions. Appendix A
reports the exact question wording for this variable.6
4All variables are log-transformed, real, per capita with base in 1965:1. Appendix A describes the data in detail.
5Further dierences among peak episodes are discussed in Appendix B.
6The index of News on Business Conditions is a leading indicator of GDP growth, with highest correlation one-
and two-quarter ahead of real GDP growth. Let Index = News on Business Conditions; GDP = real per capita GDP,
11As for Buying Conditions for Houses, the survey reports the consumers' opinion as to weather
it is a good time or a bad time to buy a house and their reasons for holding a particular view. The
possible reasons for opinions about good or bad buying conditions for houses can be summarized
in the following categories: low house prices, higher future house prices, low current interest rates,
tighter future borrowing conditions. The variable reports the fraction of respondents citing that
specic reason { see Appendix A for details. We construct four variables using this data. The rst
variable is Good Time to Buy-Prices Low, which we calculate as the dierence between Good time
to buy (house prices are low) and Bad time to buy (house prices are high); the second variable
is Good time to Buy-Prices Rising, which is equal to Good time to buy (house prices won't come
down; are going higher); the third variable is Good time to Buy-Future Tighter Credit, which is
equal to Good time to buy (borrow-in-advance of rising interest rates); and the last variable is Good
time to Buy-Credit Easy, which is calculated as the dierence between Good time to buy (interest
rates are low; credit is easy) and Bad time to buy (interest rates are high; credit is tight).7
First, we analyze the correlation between the index of News on Business Conditions and the
four variables reporting good buying conditions in the housing market. Table 1 shows that News
on Business Conditions is positively and signicantly correlated with Good Time to Buy because
of current low interest rates or because consumers expect housing prices to increase or credit
conditions to tighten in the future. During the latest boom episode these correlations become even
higher. Interestingly, News on Business Conditions is negatively correlated with Good Time to Buy
because housing prices are low and this correlation is very strong during the last boom episode.
To assess causality, we run a Granger causality test, whose results are reported in Table 2. The
index of News on Business Conditions contains statistical signicant information for consumers'
perception of Good Time to Buy both when the opinion is driven by perceptions on the current
state of the economy related to low housing prices and easy credit and when the opinion is based
on expectations of tighter future credit or of future house prices appreciation. Hence, News on
Business Conditions Granger cause consumers' perception that is it is a Good Time to Buy a
house.
log-transformed; and (GDP,4) = GDP-GDP(-4).
Correlation ((GDP,4)t=0, Indext+i)
i -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Indext+i 0.4715 0.6329 0.7372 0.7595 0.6777 0.4811 0.2744 0.0953 -0.0316
7Consumers appear to assess home buying conditions quite well. In fact, changes in home buying attitudes precede
changes in unit sales of new and existing single family homes on average by two quarters with a correlation of 0.77.
12Table 3 shows that the correlation of News on Business Conditions with house price growth is
high and signicant over the full sample and typically higher during house price boom episodes.
Moreover, News on Business Conditions contains statistical signicant information for house price
growth. In fact, the hypothesis that News on Business Conditions does not Granger cause house
price growth can be rejected at the one per cent signicance level. On the contrary, house price
growth do not contain signicant information to explain the fact that consumers heard news of
changes in business conditions. See Table 4.
Last, we estimate a house price growth regression using GMM.8 The growth rate of house
prices qt is the log change in real house prices (QQ); the short-term real interest rate (RRQ) is
the dierence between the 3-month Treasury Bill Rate and the quarter-on-quarter change in the
GDP deator. We use real per capita GDP (GDP) as a proxy for economic conditions. Population
(POP) is measured by Civilian Non-institutional Population. All variables are in log dierences {
see Appendix B for details. In addition to the standard determinants of house prices documented
in the literature, we include the index of News on Business Conditions (NEWS). We use up to
four lags of the real interest rate, real per capita GDP and population. The estimated equation is
reported in Table 5. The regression also includes an intercept term. Overall, the estimates are in
line with previous ndings. The sensitivity of house price growth to News on Business Conditions
is positive and signicant, which suggests a signicant impact of news on housing price dynamics.
The estimate of the coecient on the real interest rate is negative whereas the coecient on GDP
and population growth are positive. Interestingly, adding News on Business Conditions reduces the
signicance of both the real interest rate and GDP growth.
We also test for the importance of consumers' optimism by adding the Index of Consumers'
Sentiment (ICS) to the benchmark house price equation. The index is a weighted average of
survey questions on current economic conditions and expectations on both consumers' nancial
situation and business and nancial conditions for the country as a whole. We nd that consumers'
economic optimism positively inuences house price growth. Further, we estimate the signicance
of the alternative reasons for consumers' to believe that it is a good time to buy a house. The
estimates reported in the last four rows of Table 5 show that consumers' opinion driven by a
positive perception of the current state of the economy is either negligible, as for the perception of
easy credit, or negative, as for the perception of low house prices. In contrast, consumers' belief
based on expectations of rising house prices or tighter future credit conditions are signicantly and
8For the baseline specication see among others, Del Negro and Otrok (2007) and Favara and Imbs (2010).
13positively related to house price growth. Interpreting the estimated coecients as elasticities we
nd a sensitivity of house price growth of about 0.1 and 0.08 per cent to consumers' beliefs of rising
prices and of future tighter credit conditions, respectively.
Summarizing, both consumers' assessments of buying conditions for houses and housing prices
are explained by past values of news on business conditions. Moreover, news on business condi-
tions, expectations of future macroeconomic developments and economic optimism, are signicantly
related to house price growth.
3 The Model
Several are the papers that carry out a quantitative analysis of house market dynamics.9 However,
only few aim at explaining business cycle uctuations in both house prices and investment. Among
those, Davis and Heathcote (2005) use a calibrated multi-sector model that relies on technology
shocks to match the co-movement between consumption, non-residential investment, residential
investment and GDP; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) allowing for nancing frictions, a role for monetary
policy and a larger set of shocks also match the positive correlation between housing prices and
investment and the wealth eect of housing prices; Int'Veld, Raciborski, Ratto and Roeger (2011)
build an open-economy model of the housing market also featuring a banking sector to explore the
international repercussions of housing market dynamics.
We adopt the model of the housing market developed by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) since their
framework is rich enough to allows us to investigate the transmission mechanism of news related
to not only to the housing market and the production sector, but also to the credit market and
the conduct of monetary policy. In the following, we report the main features of the model. The
model's parameters are set equal to the mean of the posterior distribution estimated by Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) for the U.S. economy. See Table 6.
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by two types of households: the Saver and the Borrower. They both
work in the good- and housing-sector of production, consume and accumulate housing. They dier
in their discount factors, ( and 
0
). Borrowers (denoted by 0) feature a relatively lower subjective
9See, among others, Kiyotali, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2010), Kahn (2009), Rios-Rull and Sanchez Marcos (2006),
Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2007), Silos (2007).
14discount factor that in equilibrium generates an incentive to anticipate future consumption to the
current period through borrowing. Hence, the ex-ante heterogeneity induces credit ows between
the two types of agents. This modeling feature has been introduced in macro models by Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and extended by Iacoviello (2005) to a business cycle framework with housing
investment.
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where c, h , nc and nh are consumption, housing services, hours worked in the good-sector and in
the construction-sector, respectively. The parameter  denes the degree of substitution between
the two sectors in terms of hours worked,10 while  is the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
jt determines the relative weight in utility of housing services, Rt is the lending interest rate, c and
h represent the depreciation rate for capital and housing stock, respectively. lt is the land priced
at pl;t and qt is the price of the houses, all relative to the CPI. zc;t and zh;t are the capital utilization
rates of transforming potential capital into eective capital in the two sectors. Dt are lump-sum
prots paid to households. The term Ak;t is an investment-specic technology that captures the
marginal cost of producing consumption-good-sector specic capital.11 GC, GIKc and GIKhare the
trend growth rates of real consumption and capital used in the two sectors of production.  c and  
0
c
represent scaling factors of the marginal utilities of consumption. Wages are set in a monopolistic
way and can be adjusted subject to a Calvo scheme with probability 1   w every period. Xwc;t
10For a value of  close to zero, hours worked in the two sectors are close to perfect substitutes, which means
that the worker would devote most of the time to the sector that pays the highest wage. Positive values of  imply,
instead, that hours worked are far from perfect substitutes, thus the worker is less willing to diversify her working

















kh;t 1 is the housing-sector capital adjustment cost; AK represents the net growth rate of technology in
business capital, kc and kh indicate the coecients for adjustment cost (i.e., the relative prices of installing the
existing capital) for capital used in the consumption sector and housing sector respectively.
15and Xwh;t are markups on the wages paid in the two sectors. Both households set wages in a
monopolistic way.


















































































0 2 (0;) captures the Borrower's relative impatience.
Limits on borrowing are introduced through the assumption that households cannot borrow
more than a fraction of the next-period value of the housing stock. The fraction m, referred to as
the equity requirement or loan-to-value ratio, should not exceed one and is treated as exogenous
to the model. It can be interpreted as the creditor's overall judicial costs in case of debtor default
and represents the degree of credit frictions in the economy. The borrowing constraint is consistent
with standard lending criteria used in the mortgage and consumer loan markets. We explore the
eects of temporary deviations from the established degree of credit market access by assuming
that mt is stochastic. We refer to this as a loan-to-value ratio shock.
3.2 Firms
Firms producing non-durable goods (Y) and new houses (IH) face Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions. The non-housing sector produces consumption goods using capital, kc, and labor supplied




























Ah;t and Ac;t are the productivity shocks to the housing- and good-sector, respectively. Firms pay
the wages to households and repay back the rented capital to the Savers.




(kc;t   (1   kc)kc;t 1);
where Ak;t is an investment-specic shock.
Retailers operate in a monopolistically competitive market and are owned by the Savers. Prices
can be adjusted by each producer with probability 1    every period, following a Calvo-setting.
Monopolistic competition occurs at the retail level, leading to the following forward-looking Philips
curve:




  ln(Xt=X) + up;t
where  =
(1 )(1 )
 ; Xt represents the price markup and up;t is a cost-push shock. In contrast,
housing prices are assumed to be exible.
3.3 Monetary Policy Rule














where rr is the steady-state real interest rate and uR;t is a monetary policy shock. The central
bank's target is assumed to be time varying and subject to a persistent shock, st, as in Smets and
Wouters (2003). Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010), GDP is dened as the sum of consumption
and investment at constant prices. Thus
GDPt = Ct + IKt + qIHt;
where q is real housing prices along the balanced growth path.
3.4 News Shocks
The model assumes heterogeneous deterministic trends in productivity in the consumption (Ac;t),
investment (Ak;t), and housing sector (Ah;t), such that
ln(Az;t) = tln(1 + Az) + ln(Zz;t);
where Az are the net growth rates of technology in each sector,
ln(Zz;t) = Az ln(Zz;t 1) + uz;t:
17uz;t is the innovation and z = fc;k;hg: The ination target (As;t) and loan-to-value ratio (m) shocks
are assumed to follow an AR(1) process. The cost-push shock (up;t) and the shock to the policy
rule (uR;t) are assumed to be i:i:d. We set the persistence and standard deviation of the shocks as
in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). To introduce expectations of future macroeconomic developments,
we follow Christiano et al. (2008) in assuming that the error term of each shock consists of an
unanticipated component, "z;t; and an anticipated change n quarters in advance, "z;t n;
uz;t = "z;t + "z;t n;
where "z;t is i.i.d. and z = fh;c;R;s;p;j;k;mg: Thus, at time t agents receive a signal about
future macroeconomic conditions at time t + n: If the expected movement doesn't occur, then
"z;t =  "z;t n and uz;t = 0.
4 News Shocks and Boom-Bust Dynamics
In this section we identify which types of news shocks can generate empirically plausible boom-
bust cycles. Section 2.2 documented that survey data on news heard of recent changes in business
conditions are signicantly related to both house prices and consumers' opinion of favorable house
market buying conditions. Further, news on business conditions, along with consumers' expecta-
tions of rising house prices and economic optimism, aects house price growth. Agents endogenous
expectations could be related to both current or expected macroeconomic developments. Thus,
unanticipated and news shocks are both potential sources of agents expectations on economic con-
ditions and house prices. However, business cycle models that feature only standard unanticipated
shocks as sources of uctuations, cannot reproduce the hump-shaped dynamics shown in the data
during periods of boom-bust in the housing market. In fact, standard unanticipated shocks gen-
erate the strongest responses in the short run and eventually die away. Moreover, in the current
framework, macroeconomic developments lead by unanticipated shocks also fail in generating the
observed co-movement of housing prices with hours worked, investment and GDP. See Appendix
C.
4.1 News on Productivity
Changes in agents' expectations about future technological growth seems to be an important source
of business cycle uctuations. Beaudry and Portier (2006) show that business cycle uctuations
18in the data are primarily driven by changes in agents' expectations about future technological
growth. In fact, they rst documented that stock prices movements anticipate future growth in
total factor productivity and that such dynamics are accompanied by a macroeconomic boom.
Since Beaudry and Portier (2006) several authors have highlighted the importance of expectations-
driven cycles as a source of business cycle uctuations.12 According to Christiano, Ilut, Motto,
and Rostagno (2008), stock-market boom-bust cycles can be generated by changes in expectations
of future productivity shocks. In particular, they show that a standard one-sector real business
cycle model with habit persistence and costs of adjusting the ow of investment generates a boom-
bust pattern in output, consumption, investment and hours in response to news on productivity
shocks that do not materialize. The price of capital, however, is negatively correlated with all
other aggregate variables and therefore it falls and then increases. The introduction of an ination
targeting central bank and sticky nominal wages make the price of capital co-move with the other
aggregate variables and boom-bust dynamics emerge.13
We show that news on future productivity shocks generate macroeconomic booms also in a
model of the housing market that features collateralized household debt, standard preferences
and production functions, and nominal rigidities. Figure 5 reports the eect of an anticipated
increase in productivity, namely a four-period ahead expected shock to Ac;t (starred line). It also
illustrates the case in which news of a future shock to Ac;t turn out to be wrong and at time
t = 4 there is no change in productivity (solid line). The anticipation of future higher productivity
leads households to increase their current consumption expenditure. Demand pressures rise current
12The empirical literature on news shocks is growing rapidly. Among others, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) show
that innovations in expectations of future neutral productivity shocks, investment-specic shocks, and government
spending shocks account for more than two thirds of predicted aggregate uctuations in postwar United States;
Kurmann and Otrok (2010) document that new shocks about future productivity signicantly contribute to explain
swings in the slope of the term structure; Milani and Treadwell (2010) looking at expectations on the policy rate,
shows that anticipated policy shocks play a larger role in the business cycle than unanticipated shocks.
13As already shown by Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2007), a standard one-sector optimal growth model is unable to
generate boom-bust cycles in response to news. To generate co-movement, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) introduce
three elements in an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model: Variable capital utilization; adjustment costs
to investment; and a weak short-run wealth elasticity of labor supply. Other papers have focused on dierent
mechanisms. Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2007) consider a labor market matching mechanism; Floden (2007)
incorporates variable capital utilization and vintage capital; Kobayashi, Nakajima and Inaba (2007) and Walentin
(2009) show that expectations-driven cycles can arise in models with credit constraints on rms; Nutahara (2010)
prove that internal habits can help to generate co-movement in response to news on future productivity.
19ination. Expected future higher productivity also creates endogenous expectations of rising house
price that further induce Borrowers to increase their current demand for housing and thus credit.
Due to limits to credit, Borrowers increase their labor supply in order to raise internal funds for
housing investments. Savers' position in the housing market depends only on housing prices: when
housing prices are above equilibrium, Savers housing demand declines.
Given the adjustment costs of capital, rms in the consumption sector start adjusting the stock
of capital already at the time in which news about a future increase in productivity spread. This
way, when the increase in productivity occurs, capital is already in place. For the increase in
investment to be coupled with an increase in hours, wages rise in both sectors. The increase in
business and housing investment makes GDP rise. In the case of an anticipated shock that realizes,
aggregate variables boom and then slowly decline (starred line). The peak response in output
corresponds to the time in which expectations realize. In contrast, if expectations do not realize
there is a dramatic drop in both quantities and prices. See Appendix D for robustness analysis to
dierent parameter values and Appendix E for the contribution of the dierent modeling choices.14
4.2 Other News Shocks
Since boom-bust cycles in the housing market can be plausibly related to expectations of future
developments in dierent sectors of the economy we introduce changes in expectations on several
other shocks.15 In particular, we explore the role of news on housing market shocks, investment-
14As in Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008) we show that price and wage stickiness have an important role
for expectations on future productivity to generate co-movement between house prices and consumption, investment
and hours worked. However, contrary to them, we obtain boom-bust dynamics in all aggregate variables and real
wages. In our model house prices co-move with the other aggregate variables independently of whether wages are
stickier than prices or vice versa. Intuitively, the increase in housing demand and therefore housing prices in response
to news allows for an increase in both real wages and hours in the housing sector that spills over the consumption
sector. The empirical evidence in Figure 4 seems to suggest that real wages are not below trend before a peak in
house prices and that they increase throughout the boom phase. Notice also that the asset-price peak in the rst
quarter of the year 2000-2001 to which Christiano et al. (2008) refer to was preceded by a rapid increase in real wages
both in the consumption-good and in the housing sector { see Figure 11 in the Appendix. In their model, the increase
in hours is possible because the real wage falls, hence producers are willing to raise labor demand. Since nominal
wages are sticky, a decrease in real wages occurs because prices fall faster than wages. The ination-targeting central
bank responds to this fall in ination by cutting the nominal interest rate, which in turn raises investment and the
price of capital.
15Duca, Muelbauer and Murphy (2010) highlights that large swings in housing construction have had major macroe-
conomic eects in Ireland, Spain, and the US. Bjrnland and Jacobsen (2010) found that unexpected changes in in-
20specic shocks, inationary and monetary policy shocks. See Figure 6. We nd that expectations
of future housing demand shocks cannot generate the right co-movement between business and
housing investment. Due to an expected shift in preference for housing relative to consumption,
rms in the consumption sector reduce their stock of capital. As a result, business investment
falls. Because of the reduction in business investment during the boom phase, housing demand
news shocks fail to generate boom-bust dynamics consistent with the data. See Figure 6 (starred
line). In the data business investment starts increasing on average six periods before the peak in
housing prices. Expectations related to future housing demand make business investment decline
throughout the boom phase. The behavior of business investment is independent of the time horizon
of the expected increase in housing demand. Anticipated increase in housing demand at longer time
horizons only postpone the occurrence of the peak. The decline in business investment is also robust
to dierent parametrization of key model's parameters. See Appendix F. In contrast, investment-
specic news shocks and news on productivity shocks in the housing sector can generate boom-
bust cycles characterized by co-movement in GDP, consumption, investment, hours and wages. See
Figures 6 left panel.
Expectations of future expansionary monetary policy shocks that are not met are likely to cause
an housing market boom and also a subsequent macroeconomic recession. See Figure 6 right panel
(dashed line). It takes about ten quarters for GDP to go back to the initial level. Thus, good
communication on monetary policy is essential for reducing the occurrence of expectations-driven
cycles and recessions.16 Qualitatively similar is the transmission of news on the central bank's
ination target and the cost push shock. However, compared to the case of expectations of future
expansionary monetary policy shocks, expectations of a temporary upward shift in the ination
target generate a less sizable boom but a more pronounced bust. In contrast, inationary news
shocks lead to a more sizable boom but a milder bust. See Appendix F for further details.
terest rates have an immediate eect on house prices in most countries. They found that monetary policy contributes
signicantly to house price uctuations, and that house price innovations are, in turn, important for variability in
macro variables.
16If agents expect the policy rate to remain low for several periods the eect on housing prices and on all other
aggregate variables are stronger and the initial boom and the subsequent recession are more pronounced relative to
the case where the expected reduction in the policy rate is only for one period.
215 Expected Credit Conditions and Housing Booms
An often-heard explanation for the last housing boom is the easing in credit conditions. Among
others, Liebovitz (2011) nds that the most important factor related to foreclosures in the United
States is the extent of negative equity in a home, which is directly related to low down payments.
Indeed, in the years before the housing boom, mortgage credit in the US became more easily
available to new home buyers. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) looking at survey data, report that
good credit conditions was the main driver of the last boom in its initial phase. Survey data reported
in the previous section also show that expectations of future tighter credit are an important reason
for consumers to believe that is a good time to buy a house and are signicantly related to house
price growth.
In the following we analyze the eect of favorable conditions in the credit market that are
expected to be reversed in the near future. We consider a one percentage point increase to the
established loan-to-value ratio, m, coupled with expectations of future restrictions in the access to
credit.17 Figure 7 displays the case in which agents expect m to return to its original value after
four quarters. For simplicity we analyze only the case in which expectations of a reversal in credit
conditions are matched. Unmatched expectations would generate a more sizable bust.
Due to an exogenous rise in m; borrower's debt and therefore consumption and housing demand
increase. This leads to a rise in aggregate consumption, investment and GDP. Demand pressures
make housing prices rise. Lower expected access to credit in the future induce Borrowers to increase
their current demand for loans and housing further more. Borrowers also substitute consumption
for housing and supply more labor to take advantage of temporarily better access to credit. In
contrast, Savers' consumption and business investment increase because of higher interest income
and expected future lower real interest rates. Hours worked increase substantially in both sectors
and real wages fall slightly. Interestingly, the dynamics of real wages is consistent with the empirical
evidence on the housing peak of 2006:2.
It is important to notice that, in the absence of expectations of future reversal in credit condi-
tions, the model's responses would not display the hump-shaped dynamics that typically emerge
in boom-bust cycles. A current increase in m would leads to an initial increase in house prices,
investment, consumption and GDP and a slow monotone decline towards the initial level.18 In
17To illustrate the eect of changes in the access to credit, we assume that m follows an AR(1) process with
persistence equal to 0.994, as estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) Appendix D.
18See Appendix F.
22contrast, a current increase in m coupled with expectations of future restrictions in the access to
credit generates more pronounced and hump-shaped dynamics.
6 Boom-Bust Cycles and the LTV Ratio
The previous section showed that an easing of credit conditions coupled with expectations of future
tightening in credit conditions can per se drive housing booms. Here we investigate the role of the
LTV ratio for the transmission of expectations-driven cycles in our model generated by news on
shocks originated in other sectors of the economy.
Although LTV ratios for new mortgages vary signicantly across OECD countries, they have
risen in the last decade.19 The average LTV ratio for U.S. conventional single-family xed-rate
mortgages increased from 70 percentage points in March 2004 to 80 percentage points in December
2007. In fact mortgages with LTV ratios of 0.7 or less went from 25 to 19 percent of the total
while mortgages with LTV ratios above 0.9 increased from 15 to 30 percent of the total over the
period 2004 to 2007. The estimated LTV ratios of new mortgages increased by 6 percentage points
in the Euro area and 26 percentage points in the United Kingdom over the period 2004 to 2007.20
Duca, Muellbauer and Murphy (2010) argue that the distinctive feature of the recent US mortgage
lending and housing bubble was an unsustainable weakening of credit standards. By presenting
some cross-country evidence they show that nancial innovation further amplied the consumption
eect of the bubble by altering the collateral role of housing.
In the aftermath of the recent nancial crisis, several countries have considered reductions
in LTV ratios for mortgages to avoid the recurrence of house price and household debt cycles and
mitigate potential vulnerabilities in the nancial system. The U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency
is considering to increase down payment requirements for all mortgages. The Swedish Financial
Supervisory Authority has recently introduced a maximum permitted LTV ratio of 0.85; tighter
LTV ratios have also been implemented in Central and Eastern European economies, namely Latvia
and Romania.21
Do lower LTV ratios reduce the severity of cycles in the housing market? Figures 8 and 9 show
19According to the ECB report on \Housing Finance in the Euro Area," the typical LTV ratio for a rst-time house
buyer was around 80 percentage points in the Euro area in 2007, ranging between 63 and 101 percentage points.
Similar ratios have been reported by Calza et al.(2010) and Cardarelli et al. (2009).
20See Prudential Real Estate Investors (2009).
21For further details see the ECB report on \Housing Finance in Euro Area," 2009. For a discussion of alternative
policy tools, see the BIS report on "Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks", 2011.
23the cumulated booms and busts for several macroeconomic variables generated by unrealized news
on monetary policy and productivity shocks as the LTV ratio varies from zero to one. Lower LTV
ratios reduce the severity of both booms and busts in household debt, consumption and GDP. On
the other hand, lower LTV ratios slightly amplify the cumulated uctuations in housing prices,
housing and business investment.
In order to understand the eect of the LTV ratio on the aggregate economy, we compare the
responses of Borrowers' and Savers' consumption and housing demand to news on monetary policy
and productivity shock (not realized) for the benchmark value of the LTV ratio (m=0.85), a lower
(m=0.75) and a higher (m=0.95) value. See Figure 10. The LTV ratio plays an important role
at the individual level. Higher LTV ratios lead to a more sizable increase in debt, which in turn
leads to a more pronounced increase in Borrowers' consumption and above all housing demand, as
this allows for a further increase in borrowing. Consider the case of an anticipated expansionary
monetary policy shock. Because lower interest rates make borrowing cheaper and relax the credit
constraint, Borrowers raise their debt and expand consumption and housing demand. Higher LTV
ratios amplify these responses and generate larger cumulated booms for these variables. Moreover,
since Borrowers are more leveraged, the fall in Borrowers' consumption and housing expenditure
is more sizable when expectations do not materialize. Hence, higher LTV ratios are accompanied
by deeper troughs and larger busts in Borrowers' debt, consumption and housing demand. Savers,
on the other hand, are consumption smothers. In response to future lower interest rates they
expand current lending and, due to habit persistence, current non-durable consumption. However,
Savers' optimal consumption is largely unaected by alternative LTV ratios. Thus, the higher
sensitivity of aggregate consumption and GDP to news shocks for higher values of m is mainly
driven by the Borrowers' optimal consumption and debt decisions. Given the asymmetric response
of Borrowers' and Savers' housing decisions to news shocks, the eect of the LTV ratio on the
individual responses almost cancels out in aggregate terms. As a result, house prices react by
slightly less to news shocks under higher LTV ratios, which in turn generates lower sensitivity
of housing investment and business investment (driven in part by the demand for capital in the
residential sector). Hence, the heterogeneity in housing demand reduces the impact of the LTV
ratio on the transmission of news shocks to house prices and investment. A similar mechanism is at
work for the case of a favorable change in expectations about future productivity in the non-durable
sector.
In the following we explore the role of lower LTV ratios for macroeconomic volatility. We rely on
24the estimated model by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) augmented by a set of news shocks that generate
the co-movement seen in the data during periods of housing booms. Table 7 reports the theoretical
standard deviation of some key macroeconomic variables in our model for the benchmark value of
the LTV ratio (m = 0:85) a lower (m=0.75) and a higher (m=0.95) value. For this exercise we keep
the LTV ratio constant at the specied value and set the standard deviation of news shocks equal to
the estimated standard deviation of the contemporaneous shocks. A lower LTV ratio signicantly
reduces the volatility of households' debt, consumption and GDP. The eect is particularly strong
for households' debt. Compared to the benchmark LTV ratio of 0.85, its standard deviation is
reduced by 30 per cent under a LTV ratio of 0.75. However, the stabilization eect of a lower LTV
ratio on these variables is not accompanied by a reduction in the volatility of house prices and
investment. These results are robust to considering unanticipated shocks only, news shocks only,
or by reducing the standard deviation of news shocks to half the estimated standard deviation of
contemporaneous shocks. It is worth mentioning that adding news shocks to the model dampens
the reduction in the volatility of consumption, GDP and household debt and further increases the
volatility of house prices and investment.
A few papers have investigated the role of collateral requirements for the transmission of unan-
ticipated shocks and macroeconomic volatility. Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) show that lower
LTV increase the amplication of productivity shocks and thus imply higher volatility of output,
consumption, and hours worked. According to their ndings, the U.S. mortgage market liberaliza-
tion of the early 1990s, proxied by an increase in the LTV ratio, played a role in explaining the great
moderation. In contrast, Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2010) show that the transmission of mone-
tary policy shocks to consumption, investment and house prices is dampened by lower LTV ratio.22
Using a model with a richer stochastic structure that includes several types of unanticipated and
news shocks, we nd that overall, lower LTV ratios sizably reduce the volatility of household debt,
and also dampen variations in consumption and GDP, however, without mitigating uctuations in
house prices and investment.
22Walentin and Sellin (2010) quantify the eects of higher LTV ratios in an estimated model of the Swedish economy
and report an increase of 8.3 and 24 per cent in GDP and aggregate consumption, respectively, for an increase in m
from 0.85 to 0.95.
257 Conclusions
We explore the transmission mechanism of news on business conditions as a source of optimism
about the housing market and rising house prices. In our model expectations on a variety of shocks
can generate housing-market booms in accordance with the empirical ndings. However, only expec-
tations monetary policy and inationary shocks that are not fullled can generate macroeconomic
recessions.
Regarding the credit market, easier credit conditions that are expected to be reversed in the near
future can generate boom-bust dynamics in line with the recent housing market cycle. Moreover,
lower LTV ratios reduce the severity of booms and busts in GDP, consumption and households'
debt.
A quantitative assessment of the relative importance of each shock in generating boom-bust
cycles through estimation requires separate consideration. The role of monetary policy, as well as
the analysis of the optimal conduct of monetary policy, is also left to future research.
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30Table 1: Correlation between News on Business Conditions and Good Time to Buy
Variables Full Sample Boom 2006
Good Time to Buy, Prices Low -0.2160*** -0.7649***
[0.0036] [0.0000]
Good Time to Buy, Prices Rising 0.2686*** 0.5830***
[0.0003] [0.0055]
Good Time to Buy, Future Tighter Credit 0.2847*** 0.6298***
[0.0001] [0.0022]
Good Time to Buy, Credit Easy 0.1454** 0.7008***
[0.0514] [0.0004]
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signicance. Full sample: 1965:1 to 2009:4. P-values in parentheses.
31Table 2: Granger Causality Tests between News on Business Conditions and Good Time to Buy
Null Hypothesis F-statistic
News on Business Conditions does not Granger Cause GTB, Prices Low 10.9246***
[0.0000]
GTB, Prices Low does not Granger Cause News on Business Conditions 0.6911
[0.5024]
News on Business Conditions does not Granger Cause GTB, Prices Rising 3.7857***
[0.0246]
GTB, Prices Rising does not Granger Cause News on Business Conditions 0.8791
[0.417]
News on Business Conditions does not Granger Cause GTB, Future Tigher Credit 5.3644***
[0.0055]
GTB, Future Tigher Credit does not Granger Cause News on Business Conditions 0.6210
[0.5386]
News on Business Conditions does not Granger Cause GTB, Credit Easy 4.0961***
[0.0183]
GTB, Credit Easy does not Granger Cause News on Business Conditions 5.5639
[0.0046]
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signicance; 2 lags; sample: 1965:1 to 2009:4. GTB: Good Time to Buy.
32Table 3: Correlation between House Price Growth and News on Business Conditions
Full Sample Boom 1973 Boom 1979 Boom 1989 Boom 2006
0.6857 *** 0.7451 *** 0.6854 *** 0.7268 *** 0.7389 ***
[0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0006] [0.0002] [0.0001]
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signicance; sample: 1965:1 to 2009:4; P-values in parentheses.
Table 4: Granger Causality Tests between Housing Price and News on Business Conditions
2 lags
Null Hypothesis F-statistic
News on Business Conditions does not Granger Cause House Price Growth 19.0776 ***
[0.0000]
House Price Growth does not Granger Cause News on Business Conditions 2.66938***
[0.0722]
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signicance; 2 lags; sample: 1965:1 to 2009:4.
33Table 5: Housing Price Equation
Dependent Variable: qt
Regressor Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
GDPt 1.32*** 0.49** 0.60*** 1.15*** 0.79*** 0.73*** 1.22***
[0.202] [0.214] [0.226] [0.177] [0.229] [0.201] [0.212]
RRQt -1.12*** -0.23*** -0.34 -1.06*** -0.81** 0.02 -1.11***
[0.285] [0.270] [0.251] [0.306] [0.422] [0.342] [0.281]
POPt -0.06 0.30 2.13*** -3.59** -5.44** 2.00*** 0.90














*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% signicance. Standard errors in parentheses.
34Table 6: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value






j 0.12 k;c 14.25 AH 0.997
c 0.35 k;h 10.90 AK 0.992
h 0.10  0.79 j 0.96
l 0.10 rR 0.59 z 0.96
b 0.10 r 1.44  0.92
h 0.01 rY 0.52 AC 0.0100
kc 0.025  0.83 AH 0.0193
kh 0.03  0.69 AK 0.0104
X 1.15 w;c 0.79 j 0.0416
Xwc 1.15 w;c 0.08 R 0.0034
Xwh 1.15 w;h 0.91 z 0.0178
m 0.85 w;h 0.40  0.0254
" 0.32  0.69 p 0.0046
"
0
0.58 AC 0.0032 s 0.0004
 0.52 AH 0.0008 w;c 0.1218

0
0.51 AK 0.0027 w;h 0.0071
35Table 7: Macroeconomic Volatility and LTV ratios
% Dierence % Dierence
m = 0:95 m = 0:85 m = 0:75 (0.95-0.85) (0.85-0.75)
Unanticipated Shocks
Household Debt 0.2447 0.1218 0.0838 -50.238 -31.135
Consumption 0.0182 0.0162 0.0156 -10.945 -3.717
Business Investment 0.0416 0.0418 0.0420 0.427 0.633
Housing Investment 0.0837 0.0845 0.0850 0.897 0.665
GDP 0.0240 0.0227 0.0223 -5.642 -1.569
Housing Prices 0.0218 0.0218 0.0219 0.003 0.537
Unanticipated+News Shocks
Household Debt 0.2919 0.1614 0.1205 -44.695 -25.369
Consumption 0.0314 0.0289 0.0278 -8.193 -3.594
Business Investment 0.0697 0.0705 0.0713 1.159 1.075
Housing Investment 0.1362 0.1378 0.1388 1.149 0.754
GDP 0.0424 0.0408 0.0403 -3.747 -1.167
Housing Prices 0.0311 0.0315 0.0318 1.160 1.040
Standard Deviations for HP-ltered series.
36Figure 1: Real House Prices in the United States 1965:1- 2009:2; The gray shaded areas indicate recession
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Figure 2: The vertical line indicates the 2006:2 peak in real house prices. The peak is dened as the centered
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Hours Worked, Housing Sector Real Wage, Consumption Sector Real Wage, Housing Sector
Figure 3: Macroeconomic variables average behaviour during house-price Boom-Bust. The vertical line
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Real Consumption Real GDP Real Business Investment
Real Residential Investment Real Loans Hours Worked, Consumption Sector
Hours Worked, Housing Sector Real Wage, Consumption Sector Real Wage, Housing Sector
Figure 4: H-P-ltered macroeconomic variables around the house price peaks: average over all boom-bust







































































































































































































41Figure 8: News on Monetary Policy Shock and the LTV Ratio
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